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TITLE VII-LITIGATION CONCERNING
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are two operative provisions of title VII, both of which
mitigate previous judicially imposed restrictions on governmental
collection and presentation of evidence in "any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department,
officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States."' The first purports to set aside the Supreme Court's
holding in the 1968 case of Alderman v. United States,2 in which
the Court held that, in cases involving unlawful electronic surveillance, the government must make full disclosure to the defendant
of all records in its possession which contain any of his conversation or involving conversations which took place on premises
owned by him.3 In so ruling, the Court specifically rejected the
Government's contention that once a defendant has established
his standing4 to contest admission of the evidence and the illegality 5 of the Government's action, a court should then screen the
Government's files in camera and deliver to the defendant only
material which might prove "arguably relevant" in establishing
the causal relationship 6 between the unlawful surveillance and the
evidence being challenged. The purpose of the second provision is
to establish a rule of law that no court may consider any claim
that evidence offered to prove a crime is inadmissible on the
7
ground that it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act
if the alleged unlawful act occurred more than five years prior to
1 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3504(a)(2), (3) (Supp. 1971).
2 394 U.S. 165 (1969).

3
4 id.

at 180-85.
The basis for this requirement is the rule in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960), that to qualify as a "person aggrieved" by an unlawful search and seizure one must
be the victim of the search and seizure, or one against whom the search was directed.
5 The defendant must establish that a Government agent committed a violation of the
law for which exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained is considered a proper remedy,
e.g., an unreasonable search and seizure. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (196 1); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6The defendant must establish that the evidence he seeks to suppress is either the
"fruits" of the violation, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); or
something "come at by the exploitation" of the violation, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 241 (1967); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
7 18 U.S.C.A. § 3504(b) (Supp. 1971), provides:
As used in this section 'unlawful act' means any act involving the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device (as defined in § 2510(5) of this title) in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any regulation or
standard promulgated pursuant thereto.
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the crime being proved. 8 Title VII is one of the more controversial sections of the Act. 9 These provisions represent congressional unwillingness to abide the protracted procedural delays
which have resulted primarily from motions to suppress evidence
obtained by the Government via alleged illegal electronic surveillance.1 0 The Senate Committee Report on S. 30 noted that when

an organized crime leader is brought into court, an alternative to
tampering with the witnesses as a means of avoiding or delaying
prosecution is to challenge the admissibility of the evidence."
Motions to suppress evidence generally entail a long and costly
process, "especially so in cases involving alleged illegal electronic
surveillance."' 12 The Senate Committee referred to a "procedural
crisis" caused by the filing of motions to suppress, which was
worsened by the Alderman requirement for full disclosure.' 3 Fura 18 U.S.C.A. § 3504(a)(3) (Supp. 1971). E.g., in a case involving a defendant being tried
for trafficking in heroin, a 1962 illegal surveillance would be susceptible to challenge as the
source of evidence establishing such criminal transactions occurring in 1966 at defendant's
trial in 1969. The "event" is the 1966 transactions, not the 1969 trial. However, the same
surveillance would be immunized from challenge if the transactions being proved had
taken place in 1968. As a practical matter this section will be limited in its application
since it encompasses only those "unlawful acts" of the Government taking place prior to
June 19, 1968 (date of enactment of the federal wiretapping and electronic surveillancelaw, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. IV, 1968) ). Disclosure after this date will be mandated
by 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. IV, 1968), added by title III, Omnibus Crime Control & Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 218. Section 2518(10)(a) gives
the trial judge discretion as to the disclosure of alleged unlawfully intercepted communications to the defendant. (The provision is also in conflict with the Supreme Court's
decision in Alderman).
9The three dissenting members of the House Committee on the Judiciary included it
among what they termed the four "particularly egregious" titles of the Act, and called title
VII an "invidious assault" on the fourth amendment. H.R. REP. No. 91- 1549, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 182 (1970) (hereinafter cited as HouSE REPORT).
10 As an example of such delays the Senate Committee cited the Alderman case itself.
The district court on rehearing, after full disclosure of the Government's surveillance logs
had been made to defendant and 2 1/2 days of defense interrogations of numerous FBI
agents and supervisors connected with surveillance had proceeded, concluded that there
was not a single overheard conversation which Alderman had standing to challenge, and
that as to those for which his co-defendant Alderisio had standing: "There is absolutely no
relevancy in any of the material from any of the logs of the electronic surveillance to any
evidence offered at the trial of this case." S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 64
(1969) (hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT). In the case of Mrkonjic-Ruzic v. United
States, 394 U.S. 454 (1969), the defendant had fallen into an illegal electronic surveillance
five years before the date of his crime and was overheard participating in one brief
conversation. According to the Solicitor General,
It is apparent from an examination of the one and a half line surveillance log
entry reflecting that conversation that the overhearing of the conversation
could not possibly have provided evidence against the petitioner. It would
not take a trial judge 5 minutes to make that determination.
SENATE REPORT 68. However, the Court refused to accept the Solicitor General's argument and remanded the case to the district court for Alderman hearings.
11 SENATE REPORT 62.
12
Id. 63. In this regard the Supreme Court said in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244, 251 (1969):
[T]he determination of whether a particular instance of eavesdropping led to
the introduction of tainted evidence at trial would in most cases be a difficult
and time-consuming task, which, particularly when attempted long after the
event, would impose a weighty burden on any court.
Of course, the curtailment of illegal electronic surveillance would avoid this problem.
'a SENATE REPORT 64.
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thermore, where such disclosure is made, it is claimed that several
undesirable results are possible, including the chilling effect it may
have on other pending investigations and prosecutions, the damage which the reputations of innocent third parties may suffer, and
the difficulty it may create in recruitment of confidential in14
formants.
Thus, Congress has rationalized that the provisions of title VII
are a means of protecting the lives of informants and Government
agents, avoiding unjust harm to the reputations of third persons,
and protecting legal proceedings against the "delay, congestion,
expense, and distraction" caused by the litigation of numerous,
sometimes tenuous, allegations that evidence should be sup15
pressed.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Legislative Overruling ofAlderman
Not surprisingly, the Attorney General viewed the Court's
decision in Alderman as "a great disappointment to the Department.' 6 A major criticism of the decision in the opinion of the
Justice Department was that no provision was made for any
"threshold" disclosure criterion.' 7 The claimed need for threshold
criteria of disclosure is based on the Justice Department's lack of
confidence in the effectiveness of court protective orders to
safeguard the confidentiality of information not relevant to the
defendant's case, a feeling which was shared by the Senate Committee.' 8 Congress saw no constitutional obstacle to overruling
14 Id. 65.
15 Id. 62-

63.

16 SENATE REPORT 66.
17 Id. 67. Apparently this

phrase refers to some minimum standard of relevance to a
causal relationship between the unlawful surveillance and the evidence being challenged
which the defendant would be required to prove before a court could order disclosure to
him of surveillance logs. This view was also articulated by Mr. Justice Harlan in his
separate opinion:
[I]t is not difficult to imagine cases in which the danger of unauthorized
disclosure of important information would clearly outweigh the risk that an
error may be made by the trial judge in determining whether a particular
conversation is arguably relevant to the pending prosecution .... Yet though
the Court itself recognizes that 'the need for adversary inquiry is increased
by the complexity of the issues presented for adjudication,' .. . it nevertheless leaves no room for an informed decision by the trial judge that the
risk of error on the facts of a given case is insubstantial.
394 U.S. at 199- 200 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
18 National security information dealing with surveillance of a foreign embassy was
disclosed in a December 2, 1966 Washington Post article despite a protective order issued
by the District Court for the District of Columbia. See 115 CONG. REC. S 6095 (daily ed.,
June 9, 1969). As the Senate Committee said, "Again, the wiretap transcripts had remained confidential in the Government's hands for over five years until they were produced in court, supposedly in secret, only to appear in the newspaper three weeks later."
.SENATE REPORT 69.
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Alderman, calling the decision an exercise of the Supreme Court's
supervisory jurisdiction over the federal courts, not a constitutional interpretation. 19 However, such reasoning does not
appear convincing in light of the Court's rulings in this area. First,
it will be recalled that in order to obtain disclosure, the defendant
must show in his standing that the Government's action was
illegal. 20 In Katz v. United States,2 1 the Court set strict standards
for the Government to follow in cases of electronic surveillance.
Concerning the legality of electronic eavesdropping, the Court
stated that "bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of
a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations 'only in the discretion of the police'. . . . The Government
agents here ignored 'the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment,' a procedure
that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of
electronic surveillance involved in this case." 2 2 In supporting its
ruling for full disclosure by the Government to the defendant of
all electronic surveillance logs containing the defendant's conversation or made on his premises where such surveillance was
illegal, the Court said inAlderman:
Adversary proceedings will not magically eliminate all error,
but they will substantially reduce its incidence by guarding
against the possibility that the trial judge, through lack of time

or unfamiliarity with the information contained in and suggested by the materials, will be unable to provide the scrutiny
which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands.

(Emphasis added). 23
Thus the Court's holding in Katz may fairly be read asa broad
19 SENATE

REPORT 69. In arguing for such an interpretation of Alderman, Senator

McClellan noted that it is "a basic rule of practice" of the Court to avoid resting decisions
on constitutional grounds when they can be based on such grounds as statutory interpretation or the supervisory power. He cited Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), as
an example. McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55,

123 (1970). However, this particular example overlooks the fact that in Peters, the Court
granted relief to the petitioner prior to reaching his constitutional claims. Thus, whether or
not such relief was granted on constitutional grounds made no difference in that case. This
contrasts quite sharply to the situation in Alderman where the issues in contention
concerned procedural requirements dictated solely by the fourth amendment. To argue
that the decision regarding the method of disclosure was based on the supervisory power
would sharply curtail the Court's holding. See 394 U.S. at 184.
20 See notes 4 and 5 supra and accompanying text.
21389 U.S. 347 (1967).

22

Id. at 358-59.

23 394 U.S. at 184. The Court continued:

It may be that the prospect of disclosure will compel the Government to
dismiss some prosecutions in deference to national security or third-party
interests. But this is a chance the Government concededly faces with respect
to material which it has obtained illegally and which it admits, or which a
judge would find, is arguably relevant to the evidence offered against the
defendant. Id.
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proscription against Government electronic surveillance directed
against private citizens without prior judicial mandate. And in
Alderman, which involved such unlawful surveillance, the Court's
specific mention of the rigorous standards imposed by the exclusionary rule served to reaffirm its concern for the fourth
amendment rights of individuals in this area. In the face of such
pronouncements by the Court concerning the area of illegal electronic surveillance by the Government, the contention that the
Court's disclosure rule in Alderman was not constitutionally binding but simply an exercise of its jurisdiction over federal courts
24
appears weak indeed.
B. ProscribingCertain Motions to Suppress
A second major criticism of the Alderman disclosure rule was
that it contained no provision for special consideration of illegal
police conduct occurring long before the event being proved. The
Justice Department felt that the passage of a number of years
would make the connection of police illegality and the commission
of a later crime almost nonexistent.25 Thus, the Department felt
such a provision was warranted to control the increasingly "complex, lengthy, confusing, and unreliable" litigation over whether
evidence is "tainted." 2 6 As noted, this provision of title VII
prohibits a court from entertaining motions to suppress evidence
on the ground that such evidence was obtained by the exploitation
of an unlawful act if the act in question occurred more than five
years prior to the crime being proved. 27
24 However, whether Alderman itself will remain good authority for long is an open
question. The case was decided by a sharply divided Court in a five to three decision;
moreover, two members of the majority, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas,
have since been replaced by Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun, both of
whom are generally considered more conservative than their predecessors. Thus it appears
highly unlikely that the Government would accept any adverse ruling on the disclosure
provision of title VII without seeking review by the Supreme Court, with a reasonable
probability of ultimately prevailing. Moreover, there were indications as early as 1969 that
the Justice Department would eventually get all that it asked in Alderman. N.Y. Times,
March 25, 1969, at 26, col. 1.The basis for such speculation was the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Stewart in Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969), in which he wrote:
As we made explicit in Alderman, Butenko, and lvanov, the requirement that
certain products of governmental electronic surveillance be turned over to
defense counsel was expressly limited to situations where the surveillance
had violated the Fourth Amendment. We did not decide in those cases, and
we do not decide in these, that any of the surveillance did violate the Fourth
Amendment. Instead, we have left that threshold question for the District
Courts to decide in all these cases. Moreover, we did not in Alderman,
Butenko, or ivanov, and we do not today, specify the procedure that the
District Courts are to follow in making this preliminary determination. We
have nowhere indicated that this determination cannot appropriately be made
in ex parte, in camera proceedings.
349 U.S. at 313- 14.
25 SENATE REPORT 68.
26 Id.

27 18 U.S.C.A. § 3504(a)(3) (Supp. 1971). Supra note 8.
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In effect, a statute of limitations would run on constitutional
defenses thereby allowing the Government, after waiting five
years, to use evidence obtained through unlawful electronic surveillance. The Government claims that as a practical matter evidence obtained five years before an event provides-as to the
offense charged-only general information usually duplicated by
similar information from several independent sources, particularly
in the case of organized crime. 2 8 Claiming the five year period was
selected out of an abundance of caution, the Justice Department
cited a Department survey indicating that after a year or two the
probability of finding a causal link between the illegal electronic
surveillance and evidence of a later offense was "virtually nonexistent.' 29 Congress, in considering the constitutionality of this
provision, apparently acquiesced in the Justice Department's assertion that the proposal fell within the sphere of the doctrine of
"attenuation" as established in Nardone v. United States. 30 In
defense of its position, the Department argued that in the case of
an "unlawful act" the Government might show sufficient attenuation, rather than proving an independent source of the information, 3 1 to avoid the application of the exclusionary rule.
Thus, acknowledging the attenuation doctrine and accepting the
Department's claim that the probability of establishing a causal
link between information obtained through illicit electronic surveillance and the Government's proof is highly improbable after
two years, Congress has acted to abrogate the right of a defendant
to even raise this question in cases where the illegal search preceded the event by more than five years. However, congressional
reasoning on this point will not bear scrutiny. In announcing the
doctrine of "attenuation," the Court said that the causal connection between information obtained through unlawful electronic
surveillance and the Government's proof "may have become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 32 Consistent with its holding
that unlawful electronic surveillance constitutes an unreasonable
28 HOUSE REPORT 93. Of course, if this is true, the question is raised as to why the
Government continues to use illegal electronic surveillance as extensively as it does in
these cases.
29 Id.
30308 U.S. 338 (1939). The doctrine of "attenuation" recognizes that even where
challenged evidence does not have an "independent source" from illegal surveillance, it
still might be admissible. The Court expressed the doctrine thus:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information
obtained through illicit wiretapping and the Government's proof. As a matter
of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as
to dissipate the taint.
Id. at 34 1.
31See Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
32 Supra note 30.
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search per se,3 3 the Court has decided questions involving the
"attenuation" doctrine on a case by case basis.3 4 But Congress, in
passing title VII, has in effect assumed a judicial function and
decided that all instances of unlawful electronic surveillance occurring five years or more prior to an event being proved will be
conclusively regarded as falling within the scope of the doctrine.
While, practically speaking, it may be true that in a large number
of cases the five year lapse will in fact be sufficient to "dissipate
the taint," it is easy to point to several areas, particularly where
criminal activity has been long established, where such a conclusion is not at all apparent. 35 Yet with its passage of title VII,
Congress has denied the right of defendants to even raise this
question in certain situations. Moreover, it is likely that one result
of title VII will be to encourage further unlawful electronic sur36
veillance, a practice which the exclusionary rule sought to deter.
Thus, it is difficult to imagine the Supreme Court sanctioning this
rationale under the searching scrutiny which the exclusionary rule
demands. 3 7 As the dissenting members of the House Committee
on the Judiciary put it:
It may be reasonable to preclude the commencing of litigation
after a given period of time-either because the defendant
should not be forced to answer, nor the courts to hear,
charges which can only be substantiated by evidence weakened by time, or because the plaintiff has been negligent in
failing to bring suit earlier. It would be a novel application of
this logic, however, to allow the defendant to be brought to
trial and at the same time to hamper his defense by precluding
him from raising constitutional issues which might otherwise
38
be available to him.
There is one further cause for concern regarding title VII.
33
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
34
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939).
35 E.g., such activities as income tax evasion, syndicated gambling, or trafficking in
narcotics which may have been carried on for an extended period. In such cases, where
there is traditionally a lack of documentary evidence, it may be quite likely that there
exists a strong causal relationship between the unlawful electronic surveillance and the
evidence offered to prove criminal activity occurring five years later.
31 Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 222 (1968).
37 Concerning the rigorous standards required by the exclusionary rule, the Court said in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967):
'Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes' . . . and that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
See
also text accompanying note 22 supra.
38
HOUSE REPORT 185, quoting the Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, OrganizedCrime Control Act of 1969, at 24.
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Although its provisions were supposedly enacted to strengthen
the Government's evidence-gathering process in dealing with "organized criminal activities," nowhere in title VII is there any
provision which would tend to reasonably limit its application to
such activity. 9 Moreover, in view of the Government's expanded
view of its authority to engage in electronic surveillance, 40 the
fear has been expressed that title VII may be used to stifle
41
political dissent and protest activities.
III. CONCLUSION
Title VII appears to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the
exclusionary rule, an "essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment." 42 Congress' rationale for overruling the full disclosure rule
of Alderman as representing merely an exercise of the Supreme
Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the federal courts is unte39 Compare the provision of title VI, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503(a) (Supp. 197 1), pertaining to
certification by the Attorney General that the proceeding is directed against one believed
to have participated in an organized criminal activity. Such certification must accompany
any government motion to invoke the provisions of title VI.
40 In a memorandum submitted to the court in United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 Cr.
180 (N.D. Ill., filed Mar. 20, 1969), the Government maintained: "[The President,
through the Attorney General, has the constitutional power to authorize electronic surveillance . . . to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from
attempts of domestic organizations to use unlawful means to attack and subvert the
existing structure of government." Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 490 (1969).
The Government still takes this position on electronic wiretapping of domestic groups.
Recently, Judge Damon Keith ruled that the Attorney General does not have a right to
order wiretaps without a court warrant in domestic cases on the ground of protecting
national security. In United States v. Sinclair, No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., filed Oct. 7, 1969),
a case involving an alleged conspiracy and the bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor,
Judge Keith ruled that the Government had no probable cause to believe criminal activities
were being plotted when tapping of defendants' phones began in 1969. He further ruled
that the Government must immediately turn over its surveillance logs to defense counsel.
Less than two weeks earlier, Judge Warren J. Ferguson in Los Angeles had made a similar
ruling with respect to this theory. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1971, at 19, col. 1. The Government appealed Judge Keith's ruling. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals phrased the crucial
question. "where the Attorney General determines that certain wiretaps are 'necessary to
protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the
existing structure of the Government,' does his authorization render such wiretaps lawful
without judicial review?" Answering this question in the negative, Judge Edwards held
that neither title 111 of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.
(Supp. V, 1965-69), nor the President's powers to protect the nation against revolution,
exempt the Executive Branch from fourth amendment warrant requirements in cases
involving wiretapping of alleged domestic subversives. United States v. United States
District Court, Eastern Michigan, 39 U.S.L.W. 2574 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 197 1). The Government has announced its intention to appeal this ruling to the Supreme Court. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 28, 1971, at 26, col. 3.
41 Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong., Ist Sess. 489 (1969). This could be accomplished by
the use of evidence obtained from unlawful electronic surveillance of suspect domestic
organizations in future proceedings where title VII could be invoked by the Government
to 42
deny the defendants' right to challenge the source of such evidence.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
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nable. The rule in substance secures rights for defendants which
the Court has held required by the fourth amendment in light of
the Government's practices of illegal electronic surveillance.
However, the Court's holding inAlderman is now vulnerable due
to the changed makeup of the high court bench, and it is reasonably probable that this provision of title VII could be upheld by
the Court in subsequent proceedings.
Similarly, congressional justification of the five year cutoff for
defendants challenging the admissibility of certain evidence cannot be squared with the Court's rulings on the doctrine of "attenuation." It is indeed difficult to imagine that the Court will
uphold this provision abrogating a defendant's constitutional right
based on a mere "probability" that the validity of his claim is
"virtually nonexistent."
A further danger of title VII is the possibility of its use by the
Government in a wide range of criminal cases, including those
totally unconnected with organized crime as that term is normally
understood.

